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I. Introduction 
Counter-terrorism officials in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
arguably the two most significant Western protagonists in the ―War on Terror,‖ 
responded to the events of September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005 with an increasing resort 
to the use of ―intelligence-led policing‖ methods such as racial and religious profiling.1  
―Intelligence-led policing‖ includes a number of unobjectionable and obvious techniques 
such as the use of tips, informants, and surveillance to identify individuals engaged in, or 
preparing for, criminal activity.   However, it also seems to carry the implication that if 
the police have information suggesting that a terrorist act is more likely to be committed 
by, say, an Asian than a non-Asian, it is not discrimination to subject individual Asians to 
more ―policing‖ than individual non-Asians.  Reliance on intelligence, to the effect that 
most people who commit a certain crime have a certain ethnicity, can lead to less 
favourable treatment of an individual with that ethnicity because of his membership in 
that group, not because of any act he is suspected or known to have committed.  If 
counter-terrorism officers decide not to detain, search, and question a white man, but 
instead to detain, search, and question a similarly situated, attired, and accoutred Arab 
man because he is Arab, the credo of intelligence-led policing means that the officers will 
not consider themselves to have used ethnicity as a criterion for police attention, but to 
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have relied on the extent to which the individual matches an intelligence estimate that has 
Arab men as more likely perpetrators of the particular kind of crime under investigation.  
The ―intelligence‖ is not about the individual—the police will generally have only one 
relevant piece of intelligence about a stopped-and-searched individual: his apparent 
ethnicity—and yet the state will claim that it did not stop the individual because of his 
race, but because of their ―intelligence.‖   
This legerdemain offers a stern test of protections against state discrimination, in 
that it can exploit a superficial jurisprudential conception of discrimination as something 
that is done, rather than something that is experienced.
2
  US constitutional anti-
discrimination protections, for example, will not recognise differential treatment as 
discrimination unless the ―perpetrators‖ have been shown to intend to impose less 
favourable treatment on people of a certain race.
3
  Moreover, from the perspective of 
police services with few other ideas of how to cope with the amorphous threat posed by 
international terrorism, the use of ―intelligence‖ to justify a stop and search or detention 
can arguably represent what lawyers term a ―least restrictive alternative‖, that is, a course 
of action that, of the various choices available, is the least damaging to the suspect 
group‘s constitutional rights. This is significant because both US and European 
protections against government discrimination allow the fact that a given method is the 
least harmful one available to weigh in favour of finding differential treatment justified, 
and hence legal.  The same laws should, but often do not, give a comparable weight to the 
fact that the same method, to those stopped, searched or detained, can feel not only 
arbitrary, but over-broad – in the sense that it captures many entirely innocent citizens – 
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and under-inclusive – in that it may fail to catch dangerous individuals who do not fall 
into the suspect racial category.  
The Chief Constable of the British Transport Police, in the wake of the July 7, 
2005 bombings in the London Underground, put the state position on the subject 
succinctly: 
 
Intelligence-led stop and searches have got to be the way ... We should not waste 
time searching old white ladies. It is going to be disproportionate. It is going to be 
young men, not exclusively, but it may be disproportionate when it comes to 
ethnic groups.
4
 
 
The position of those young, male Asians might be put just as succinctly: whatever their 
reason for doing it, the police systematically treat us worse than white people, in a 
stigmatising way, and the law should offer some kind of meaningful protection against 
that.
5
 
In light of the challenges that intelligence-led profiling poses to provisions against 
government discrimination, this paper discusses the extent to which, and why, such 
protections must incorporate a protective, or effects-based, definition of discrimination, 
coupled with a requirement of proportionate action.  Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (―ECHR‖),6 as applied in the UK through the Human 
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Rights Act 1998 (―HRA‖),7 will serve as an example of a provision which has a greater 
potential to exhibit such characteristics in a counter-terrorism context than does the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment to the US Constitution.
8
 This paper sets out two 
key contentions. First, we argue that Article 14 ECHR has a more protective, and less 
―prosecutorial,‖ conception of discrimination than has the Equal Protection Clause 
(―EPC‖), meaning that judges need not find a discriminatory motive to find that 
discrimination has occurred. Second, we contend that Article 14 provides the judiciary 
with the key tool of proportionality, which, when properly applied, makes it harder for 
discrimination to stand up to scrutiny.   
The argument set out in this paper, and the comparison employed to support it, 
focuses exclusively on the work that can be done by constitutional (or in the ECHR 
context quasi-constitutional) anti-discrimination provisions.  It makes no empirical claims 
about the relative effectiveness of US and UK law in dealing with racial profiling or 
intelligence-led policing.  It also falls outside the scope of this paper to examine, for 
example, statutory, regulatory, or soft-law approaches to dealing with profiling.  It is 
concerned instead with what kind of constitutional equality jurisprudence has the best 
chance of subjecting profiling practices to judicial scrutiny.  To this end, Section II below 
explains the context in which intelligence-led policing flourishes, and how this discussion 
contributes to the profiling debate in both the US and the UK.   Section III introduces the 
Article 14 analysis and sets out its strengths in comparison to the EPC.  Section IV argues 
for a particular approach to the application of Article 14 proportionality to profiling, a 
practice with which Article 14 has yet to grapple in the UK.  Finally, Section V will 
illustrate the impact an Article 14-style analysis would have on EPC jurisprudence by 
subjecting US cases to Article 14 scrutiny.  
We turn first to the context: the threat of global terrorism and the pre-emptive 
security policy that has emerged to deal with it. The purpose of this discussion is firstly to 
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explain how ―intelligence-led policing‖ is related to the particular nature of the risk 
represented by terrorism and the perception of that risk by policy makers and the public; 
secondly, we seek to point out how the disproportionate fear generated by the terrorist 
threats can lead both policy-makers and the public to disregard traditional civil libertarian 
safeguards for suspect individuals, making the role of the judiciary of particular 
importance in this area.  
 
II. The Context of the Debate about Intelligence-Led Policing and 
Profiling 
 
In the age of the ‗war on terror,‘ we are increasingly told by governments and 
some commentators
9
 that we live in a state of exceptionalism. The risks posed by 
international jihadist terrorism are said to be of a different order from those previously 
encountered. As Tony Blair put it, ‗the rules of the game are changing:‘10 not only, we 
are told, do we face a different order of threat, but our response must be prepared to put 
aside traditional constraints upon the ability of the executive branch to protect us – 
constraints represented by human rights norms, in particular the rights to liberty and a fair 
trial. The UK response to this threat has consisted of a torrent of anti-terrorist measures, 
starting with the Act of 2000 –  five major Acts in six years. A similar phenomenon may 
be seen in numerous other jurisdictions: for example even though  Australia has suffered 
no attacks on its soil in the last twenty years, the previous Howard Government secured 
the passage of no less than 44 separate anti-terrorism statutes between 2002 and 2007.
11
  
The nature of this response is of course strongly linked to the particularly 
amplified public and governmental response to the risk of terrorist attacks. As Victor 
Ramraj puts it, ―…all too often, policy responses are motivated by a widespread public 
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misperception of risk and a heightened collective sense of fear and vulnerability that call 
into question our ability to think clearly about policy options‖.12 Studies of risk 
perception indicate that people do not on the whole assess levels of risk objectively,
13
 
being heavily influenced by recent disasters,
14
 peer perceptions - in particular so called  
‗risk amplification‘ in the media15 - and are prone to over-reacting to risks represented by 
dramatic and unfamiliar events or causes 
16
 Thus the massive response to the 52 deaths 
caused by terrorist attacks in the UK in the last decade dwarfs the low-key continuing 
concern generated by the 21,000 deaths on the roads in that period.
17
 The same could be 
said but even more strongly about the extraordinarily far-reaching US response to 9/11 
itself. 
Such responses are partly explicable because the strong emotions generated by 
terrorist attacks leads to the phenomenon termed ―probability neglect‖, whereby people 
focus upon ―the terrible consequences if risks were to re-materialise, rather than the 
remote risk that they will‖.18 Hence, ―worst case scenarios have a habit of migrating from 
the realm of fantasy to the domain of policy deliberation‖.19 Thus the insecurity created 
by terrorist attacks, their reportage in the media, and at times by governmental rhetoric 
creates what Conor Gearty terms ―the risk-obsessed society.‖ Indeed, ironically, ―‗The 
intense sense of powerlessness which accompanies the consciousness of ignorance about 
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the future works to empower terrorism‘‖.20 This sense of insecurity leaves a democracy 
highly vulnerable to what Phillip Petitt terms ―the politics of passion‖, in which 
politicians represent themselves as the only group really concerned about public fears, 
simultaneously amplifying them, and asserting that they hold the only solutions – more 
and tougher legislation.
21
 As Victor Ramraj puts it,  
 
―the dysfunctional nature of populist democracy is especially pronounced in a 
fearful and emotionally-charged atmosphere in which judgments about risk are 
likely to be distorted, resulting in ill-conceived, hastily enacted laws that 
unnecessarily restrict individual freedom.‖22  
 Not only is the new legislation often hastily enacted and driven by fear – that fear 
has also changed the legislation‘s aim and method. The key characteristic of much new 
anti-terrorism legislation is its shift away from the criminal justice model of punishing 
committed offences through the ordinary criminal courts to a strategy of pre-emption: 
measures are taken against individuals based upon an assessment of the risk they pose, in 
other words of their likely future conduct. Lucia Zedner refers to this as a move towards a 
‗pre-crime society‘ based on the ‗logic of security‘, which has started to overshadow the 
‗post-crime orientation of criminal justice‘.23 In other words, we have a shift from a post-
crime system, based on criminal offences, proof and punishment, to a pre-crime society, 
based on risk-assessment, suspicion and pre-emption. As David Dyzenhaus has put it:  
 
―The potentially horrific outcomes of terrorist action are seen to mandate a pre-
emptive or preventative response reflective of ‗a new and urgent emphasis upon 
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the need for security, the containment of danger, the identification and 
management of any kind of risk.‘‖24 ‗ 
 
This emphasis on prevention is then legally manifested in ―control‖ measures, directed 
towards acts in the future rather than events in the past.‘25 Examples include: the 
establishment of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay;
26
 the powers to detain foreign 
terrorist suspects indefinitely without proof of commission of actual offences introduced 
in the UK by Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001; ‗Control 
Orders‘, under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 Act, also introduced in Australia 
into Division 104 of the Criminal Code (Cth), powers of detention for investigatory
27
 and 
preventive purposes
28
 in Australia and the power to detain non-citizens in Canada on 
grounds of risk to national security,
29
 recently declared unconstitutional by the Canadian 
Supreme Court;
30
 the use of racial profiling in stop and search under anti-terrorism 
powers in the UK and USA. As Zedner puts it: 
 
The urge to avert the risks posed by the growth of terrorist activity has generated 
an emerging genre of preventive justice. Standing outside the criminal process 
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and the ordinary protections of the criminal law, preventive justice operates pre-
emptively in the name of public protection.
31
 
 
These pre-emptive measures, which dramatically restrict the rights of members of the 
suspect group on the basis of an assessment of what they intend, or are seeking to do, are 
thus particularly pernicious; Amnesty International has described such legislation as 
amounting to a ―sustained attack‖ upon human rights in the UK, as part of the ―war on 
terror.‖32 Its significance is all the greater because of the well-known tendency of 
―temporary‖ or ―emergency‖ powers to become permanent,33 and of the tendency of 
―extraordinary‖ measures, originally introduced to combat the special threat from 
terrorism, to colonize the regular criminal law.
34
 Examples include the erosion of the 
right to silence,
35
 the police power to stop and search within a designated area without 
reasonable suspicion
36
 and powers of extended detention before charge.
37
 Control orders 
for terrorist suspects were introduced only in 2005, but the Government has already 
floated the idea of Serious Crime Prevention Orders - a modified control order - to be 
used against drug-dealers, people traffickers and fraudsters.
38
 Moreover, the use of 
Special Advocates
39
 has spread rapidly. As a recent commentary noted, “Originally 
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intended for a mere handful of deportation cases each year, [Special Advocates] are now 
used in Parole Board Hearings, asset-freezing cases, some employment hearings and 
immigration cases, and certain special Tribunals concerned with anti-terrorism powers.‖40 
The Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights has noted that special 
advocates and secret evidence ‗are now used in 22 different types of legal proceedings in 
the UK.‘41 As Zedner puts it: ―The less demanding procedural protections attached to 
exceptional measures infiltrate and transform the mainstream criminal process with 
alarming speed.‖42 
 The courts are the crucial forum in which this galloping exceptionalism, fear-
mongering, and rights-trammeling should encounter forensic challenge; however, they 
have remained in many respects fairly deferential to the executive and Parliament in this 
area.  As a result, in the view of many commentators, judicial scrutiny has been neither as 
structured nor as intense as it should be
43
 – a point we will return to. More disturbing is 
the fact that despite this deference, the limited assertiveness that the courts have shown 
has led to strong tensions between judiciary and executive – and has taken place in the 
context of, and seemingly apparently contributed to, an apparent rising hostility towards 
the notion of human rights in contemporary British political culture. Members of the last 
UK Government were not slow to condemn judges for undermining counter-terrorism or 
crime-fighting efforts by (as they saw it) elevating the abstraction of rights over the 
reality of security;
44
 hence Tony Blair‘s proposal when Prime Minister to amend the 
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Human Rights Act so as to require a ‗balance between the rights of the individual and the 
rights of the community to basic security‘45 a theme that was echoed and amplified in 
plans by the Conservative Party when in opposition for a new Bill of Rights.
46
 In the US, 
Senator John McCain made an extraordinary attack upon the decision of the US Supreme 
Court decision in Boumediene v Bush, which restored to Guantanamo Bay detainees the 
right of habeas corpus, describing it as ―one of the worst decisions in the history of this 
country‖.47  
These tensions between executive and judiciary then become part of the wider 
disenchantment with the notion of human rights - and the HRA specifically – just referred 
to.  As Lazarus and Goold put it,  ―Since 9/11, the words ―security‖ and ―human rights‖ 
have, in the collective imagination, now come to connote an almost insuperable 
opposition.‖48 When the public are told that they live in an age of terror, rights are very 
easily portrayed as ―a gamble with people‘s safety‖.49 These ―irresponsible rights‖, which 
endanger the safety of the majority, are then counter-posed with the ―forgotten‖ or 
―neglected‖ rights of the decent, law-abiding majority to live in peace and safety. The 
―wrong‖ kind of rights,  rights for them (the other), are then easily portrayed as ―a 
conspiracy against common sense and practical wisdom‖, conjured up by a liberal, effete, 
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and - from the little-Englander perspective - European-loving elite.
50
 Human rights are 
thus cast as elitist, narrow and selfish, and even archaic, in the face of a threat to our lives 
and whole way of life. As Loader succinctly puts it: ―When rights are discursively made 
to carry such risks, it is little wonder that security so often trumps them.‖51   
 In this kind of atmosphere, it is of crucial importance that the constitutional 
constraints on coercive state powers, especially those intended to protect ―them‖—the 
minority ‖other‖ —have the strength to impose real obstacles to the fearful will of 
majoritarian pro-security opinion.  Contrasting the US and UK constitutional approaches 
to protecting against government discrimination provides illustrations of the two 
dominant models for constraining majority targeting of ethnic or religious minorities.  
The US side represents the prosecutorial model: a constitutional provision that seeks only 
to prosecute intentional mistreatment, and only when that mistreatment could have been 
avoided without undermining the achievement of the state objective.  The UK side of the 
comparison shows the protective/proportionate model—or at least the potential for it—
which recognises discrimination as the experience of distinct treatment, regardless of 
motive, and allows it only when the burden on the minority is proportionate to the 
benefits to the society.   
Racial and religious profiling in counter-terrorism efforts furnish illustrative 
examples of the kind of intelligence-led, proactive measure that might satisfy the US 
model, but should nevertheless fail a proportionality assessment under Article 14 ECHR.  
We do not develop a detailed definition of ―racial and religious profiling,‖ because our 
analysis is concerned less with the nature of the phenomenon than with approaches to 
controlling instances of it.
52
  It should suffice to state that we will discuss how Article 14 
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and the EPC would deal with situations where government law enforcement efforts, 
either in the form of general policies or individual decisions by law enforcement agents 
or police, employ race or religion as an outcome-determinative factor in deciding whom 
to stop, search, question, arrest, detain, or investigate.
53
  ―Outcome-determinative‖ refers 
to the fact that profiles can include race or religion as one of several factors, but if the 
profile works in such a way that a person who meets all of the criteria other than the 
profiled race will not, e.g. be stopped and searched, but a person who meets the other 
criteria and race will do, this is disparate treatment on the ground of race, and hence 
prima facie discrimination.  We emphasise that this is prima facie discrimination, 
because we do not assume that there is anything unlawful or even unethical about it, 
simply that it technically involves distinct treatment of individuals who differ solely in 
their race; this only becomes unlawful and open to criticism if it lacks an objective 
justification as defined according to the relevant constitutional provision.   
Although the ―classic‖ profiling scenario involves preventive policing, where a 
profile is used to narrow the field of targets in efforts to identify terrorists before they 
                                                                                                                                                 
perpetrator to justify stopping or searching only people of the race described is by 
definition justifiable and not profiling, see R. Richard Banks, Essay, Racial Profiling and 
Antiterrorism Efforts, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1201, 1202–04 (2004); Deborah A. Ramirez 
et al., Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1195, 1202–07 (2003); and (2) those who see profiling as including any use of race as a 
criterion for police attention, see AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SANCTIONED BIAS: RACIAL 
PROFILING SINCE 9/11, at 3 (2004); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Choosing Anti-Terror 
Targets by National Origin and Race, 6 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 9, 11 n.6 (2003); 
Harcourt, supra note 54, at 1345; Kent Roach, Making Progress on Understanding and 
Remedying Racial Profiling, 41 ALTA. L. REV. 895, 896, 900 (2004).  
53
 This is a definition similar to the one set out in Stephen R. Gross & Debra Livingston, 
Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUMBIA L REV 1413, 1415 (2002), although they 
exclude race-focused investigations based on eyewitness descriptions of alleged 
perpetrators, because this does not involve a ‗global judgment about a racial or ethnic 
group as a whole.‘   We prefer the approach urged by, among others, Bernard Harcourt 
(supra note 54) who argues that what is in the mind of the person who uses race as a 
criterion should be considered only as part of a justification for racially distinct treatment; 
a pure motive cannot change the fact that stopping only black people because the 
eyewitness claimed the perpetrator was black nevertheless involves stopping people 
because they are black.     
 14 
commit acts of terrorism, we do not exclude situations where police use eyewitness 
descriptions of the apparent race or religious garb of the perpetrators of a specific crime.  
In such cases, viewed from the perspective of the stopped, searched, or detained 
individual, their race or religion was a determining factor in their being stopped, 
searched, or detained.  The presence of intelligence data or an eyewitness account simply 
makes the profile arguably more reliable, and hence more susceptible to justification, but 
it does not change the prima facie discriminatory nature of the state action.
54
  The motive 
of the state may simply be to focus attention on those who resemble the suspect, but the 
means of pursuing that motive is distinct treatment of some people because of their race 
or religion. Although, as discussed at footnote 52 above, there are some who would 
disagree with this definition, we choose to join those who support a broader definition, 
because a narrower definition excludes from constitutional scrutiny disproportionate 
reliance on eyewitness statements to justify extensive disparate treatment on the grounds 
of race or religion (see Section V below).  
Two circumstances make profiling in counter-terrorism efforts particularly 
interesting for the purpose of this comparison. First of all, countering the threat of 
terrorism will almost always represent a compelling state interest,
55
 that is, one that is 
legally capable of justifying discriminatory treatment. Second, terrorism presents such an 
elusive target for law-enforcement efforts that often it seems that the only effective 
actions the state can take must employ broad generalizations that impose burdens on 
specific groups (and consequently on society as a whole).
56
  These facts mean that 
profiling can be defended on the ground that it pursues a compelling interest through a 
means as narrowly tailored as possible without forfeiting its law-enforcement 
effectiveness, which will strike many as an ethically or legally sufficient justification.  
However, accepting such a justification ignores the possibility that in some circumstances 
profiling will impose an individual, group, or societal burden that is so unacceptable that 
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the method should be rejected even in the absence of a ―less restrictive alternative.‖  As 
discussed further below, this scenario would have a different fate under Article 14 than 
under the EPC.   To demonstrate this, the next section provides a brief overview of how 
the EPC and Article 14 analyses work.  Section IV will then make some arguments about 
how Article 14 should be applied under the HRA in the UK, and Section V will look at 
US profiling cases that got nowhere under the EPC, and assess how they would fare 
under the analysis we propose.  In doing this we do not purport to offer up a fully 
developed legal model for analysing racial or religious profiling, but merely to begin a 
discussion about how a protective approach to controlling state discrimination, that 
requires any disparate treatment to procure benefits proportional to the individual and 
social costs imposed by it, can more effectively deal with profiling than a prosecutorial, 
one-sided scrutiny approach. 
 
 
III. The Analysis under the EPC and Article 14 
Under the US EPC, which purports to guarantee the ―equal protection of the laws,‖57 
it is only when a state measure or decision represents intentional discrimination on the 
basis of a ―suspect classification‖ like race or religion that Supreme Court jurisprudence 
requires the application of strict scrutiny to that measure.
58
  In the absence of strict 
scrutiny, measures very seldom violate the EPC, so a finding of discrimination on the 
basis of a suspect classification is a virtual necessity for a successful claim.
59
 When the 
state impinges on a fundamental right or distinguishes on a basis that singles out a 
discrete and insular minority and thus engages in a ―suspect classification,‖ the Court 
must apply ―strict scrutiny.‖ A measure will satisfy strict scrutiny if it is ―narrowly 
tailored to a compelling state interest.‖60 Prior to the 1970s, any other classification 
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would satisfy the EPC as long as the distinction bore a rational relationship to a 
legitimate objective.
61
 In essence, the EPC protected against disparate treatment on 
illegitimate, irrational or purely arbitrary grounds, and adopted a presumption that 
distinctions inimical to a racial minority, or that restricted fundamental liberties, denied 
that protection. 
By the 1970s, the ―discrete and insular minority‖ underpinning fell away. This is not 
to say that the U.S. Supreme Court stopped considering it important that a distinction 
appeared to burden a group‘s ability to participate politically but that insularity and 
minority status ceased to control whether the Court would view a classification as 
―suspect.‖ The Court began to view racial distinctions as intrinsically problematic for 
reasons beyond political participation, such that racial distinctions that burdened whites, 
like affirmative action, were also treated as suspect.
62
 National origin and alienage have 
also been found suspect without reference to minority status.
63
 In 1976, responding 
almost certainly to a growing conviction that differential treatment of women and men 
created social problems rather than to a conviction that women were an insular minority 
that could not participate effectively in the political process, the Court declared that 
distinctions on the basis of gender are ―quasi-suspect,‖ and must face ―intermediate 
scrutiny.‖64 Intermediate scrutiny requires that a challenged law ―substantially advance 
an important state interest.‖65 The Court subsequently applied this level of review to 
classifications based on illegitimacy.
66
 The Court has declined to make sexual 
orientation, mental retardation, disability or age suspect or quasi-suspect classifications. 
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The analysis as it stands today begins by asking whether a challenged distinction 
rests on a suspect or quasi-suspect ground or burdens a fundamental right. Proving that a 
measure differentiates on a suspect or quasi-suspect basis requires showing not only that 
the law has the effect of distinguishing on, for example, the grounds of race or sex, but 
that it intends to have that effect.
67
 Thus a stop-and-search profile that has the effect of 
stopping only persons of Middle-Eastern or South Asian ethnicity, but not whites, does 
not receive any heightened scrutiny if the state does not act under a motivation to 
distinguish on the basis of ethnicity, but instead acts under a motivation to target persons 
who satisfy an intelligence-based profile. If a challenged state action neither employs a 
suspect or quasi-suspect classification nor restricts a fundamental freedom, then ―rational 
basis‖ review applies, calling only for the law to bear a rational relationship to a 
legitimate governmental purpose. If a measure distinguishes on the basis of gender or 
illegitimacy, it must substantially advance an important state interest, and if it classifies 
on the basis of race, national origin, or alienage, it must be narrowly tailored to a 
compelling state interest. 
 This last test focuses exclusively on the reasons for choosing the measure in 
question, not its impacts.  It means that so long as the state interest pursued by a measure 
ticks the ―compelling‖ box, and there is no obvious way to pursue the interest as 
effectively through a less intrusive means, then the measure complies with the 
Constitution, regardless of the extent of its negative impacts.  This contrasts sharply with 
proportionality under the ECHR.  Proportionality is the closest Convention analogy to the 
varying levels of scrutiny under the EPC, in that it represents the test for justification of 
prima facie unequal treatment.  In the context of racial profiling the relevant comparison 
is between proportionality and the strict scrutiny that should apply to all cases of state 
discrimination on the basis of race. Unlike strict scrutiny, proportionality requires that a 
challenged measure not impose a negative impact that is disproportionate to the extent to 
which the measure advances a legitimate state interest.
68
  Rather than simply looking at 
the quality of the state‘s justification, proportionality thus represents a two-sided 
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balancing approach, under which the extent to which the interest is compelling and the 
measure effective in pursuing it (the state‘s side of the balance) must outweigh the extent 
of the negative impact on rights interests (the claimant‘s side of the balance).   
The first thing to note about Article 14 is that in one important way it offers a 
narrower scope of protection than the Equal Protection Clause.  It does not protect against 
all discrimination by the state, but only against discrimination ―in the enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms set out in [the] Convention‖.69  That means that, before Article 14 
can apply, the challenged measure must affect another Convention-protected right.  
Fortunately for this discussion, most racial and religious profiling in the context of 
counter-terrorism will engage either the right to liberty (Article 5), to privacy (Article 8), 
to free exercise of religion (Article 9), or to freedom of association (Article 11).
70
  In 
other respects, however, Article 14 can apply more broadly than the EPC because it is 
―protective‖ as opposed to ―prosecutorial.‖  In other words, Article 14 promises to 
protect residents of ECHR-signatory states from experiencing inequality of treatment; in 
contrast, a prosecutorial anti-discrimination provision like the EPC seeks to define 
―discriminatory conduct,‖ and focuses on whether a challenged measure was the product 
of such conduct.  Article 14 attempts to identify unequal treatment resulting from state 
action—however motivated—and to put a stop to it if its impacts outweigh its benefits to 
society.   
There is little ―legislative history‖ of how the Council of Europe arrived at the 
particular formulation it adopted for Article 14 in 1950, but it is known that the 
penultimate version put up for debate read ―The rights and freedoms defined in this 
Convention shall be protected without discrimination . . .‖; the final version adopted, 
however, provided that ―[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination . . .‖ (emphasis added).71  This 
change meant that ―instead of the obligations of the Contracting States, the position of the 
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individual concerned is placed in the foreground‖.72  Had the provision stated that rights 
―shall be protected without discrimination‖, the implication would have been that state 
actors must not commit discrimination when protecting Convention rights.  However, 
since Article 14 was finally drafted as a guarantee that the state will ―secure‖ the 
―enjoyment‖ of rights without discrimination, this suggests that Article 14 binds 
signatory states to see to it that state action does not abridge the equal enjoyment of 
Convention rights.  This makes Article 14 a protector of equality, not a prosecutor of 
discriminatory conduct.   
In the UK, Article 14 has domestic legal effect under the Human Rights Act 1998 
(―HRA‖), which makes the key ECHR rights directly enforceable against public 
authorities in UK courts.  The courts are bound to apply Parliamentary statutes, but 
section 3(1) HRA requires judges, ―so far as it is possible to do so‖ to read and ―give 
effect‖ to all legislation and regulations in a way that is compatible with the Convention 
rights, even where a natural reading of the law would violate the Convention.  Where a 
measure cannot be read in a Convention-compatible way without going against the 
manifest intent of Parliament, section 4 HRA requires that the court issue a ―declaration 
of incompatibility,‖ meaning that the court will apply the statute as written, but 
substantial political pressure will exist for Parliament to amend the offending statute 
(although it is not legally obligated to do so).  Thus the courts have a clear duty to 
prevent violations of the Convention by state actors, although Parliament can in the end 
insist upon such violations by clearly providing for them in statute.
73
 So far, the 
government has always responded to declarations of incompatibility by bringing forward 
new legislation to remove the incompatibility.
 74
   
Once invoked, Article 14 forbids ―unjustified‖ discrimination by the state on a 
non-exhaustive list of grounds that includes race and religion.
75
  Direct discrimination 
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constitutes treating one group less favourably than an analogous comparator (disparate 
treatment). But crucially, Article 14 has also been interpreted as prohibiting what is 
termed ―indirect discrimination‖, or disparate impact: this occurs where an apparently 
neutral measure has the effect of disadvantaging a particular group or where it fails to 
treat differently a person who is relevantly different.
76
 An example of the former would 
be a rule that all police officers must be over, say 5‘7‖. This is neutral on its face, but 
clearly more women would be unable to fill the requirement than men; consequently the 
requirement indirectly discriminates against women. An example of the latter would be 
affording time off to employees for Christian religious holidays without making 
adjustments for non-Christians whose holidays fall on different days.  Crucially, under 
Article 14, it is not necessary for a claimant to show a discriminatory motive, although 
motive can affect whether the discrimination is justified.
77
 It suffices that the differential 
treatment or impact was in fact caused by the impugned characteristic (in other words, 
that it would not have happened without it). But showing what lawyers term prima facie 
discrimination in this way is only the first step. The question then becomes whether the 
discrimination can be justified - only unjustified discrimination being unlawful.
78
  
Justification depends on whether the challenged measure pursues a legitimate state 
objective, and is proportionate to that objective. 
 
IV. How Article 14 proportionality should work under the HRA 
 
Proportionality entered into European law through German law, which developed 
a doctrine of proportionality requiring that state acts or measures be (1) suitable to 
achieve a legitimate purpose, (2) necessary to achieve that purpose, and (3) proportional 
in the narrower sense: it must not impose burdens or ―cause harms to other legitimate 
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interests‖ that outweigh the objectives achieved by the measure.79  This formulation has 
not been adopted wholesale into the case-law on Article 14, but the last element, 
―proportionality in the narrower sense,‖ was incorporated into the Article 14 analysis in 
the Belgian Linguistics case, which was in fact the first mention of the doctrine of 
proportionality by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR).
80
  The 
formulation adopted there required ―proportionality between the means employed and the 
aim sought to be realized.‖81  It has subsequently been made clear that this requires the 
rejection of state-imposed differential treatment that produces ―harms to other legitimate 
interests‖ disproportionate to the advancement of a legitimate aim secured by the 
measure.
82
  The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights has identified ―social 
inclusion‖ and dignity generally, and racial and religious equality specifically, as 
common interests of the Contracting States of the ECHR.
83
  Proportionality therefore 
contemplates a situation in which the harm of a measure, in terms of the extent of 
invasion of an individual‘s rights, or in terms of the damage to common interests in equal 
dignity and social inclusion, could outweigh the benefits of even a narrowly tailored 
measure aimed at a compelling interest.  Thus, in theory, a profiling policy of searching 
all people with an Asian appearance carrying a backpack into the London Underground 
would treat its targets less favourably than similarly situated non-Asians because they 
were Asian, and would violate Article 14 if the impact of the searches (on the claimants, 
other Asians, and the interest of social inclusion in general) outweighed the counter-
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terrorism benefits of the policy, even if the policy was narrowly tailored to pursuing the 
compelling objective of security from terrorist attack. 
UK courts have not always given Article 14 this effect, but there are exceptions.  
For example, A and Others v Home Secretary
84
 concerned a challenge to one of the key 
‗preventive‘ anti-terrorism measures mentioned above - the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act 
which provided for the detention without charge foreign nationals living in the UK whom 
the Secretary of State believed to be involved in international terrorism and to pose a risk 
to the national security of the UK. Those detained were suspects who could not simply be 
deported to their home countries because there was a risk that they would be tortured or 
executed upon their return, and the Convention itself forbids deporting persons in the face 
of such a risk.  This meant that suspected terrorists who happened to be British nationals 
were not detained (regardless of the risk they posed), while those without UK nationality, 
but who could not be deported for fear of torture in their home countries, were 
imprisoned.  In order to impose this burden on liberty in contravention of Article 5 
ECHR, the government was required temporarily to suspend the operation of Article 5 on 
the ground of the ―national emergency‖ it claimed was represented by the global terrorist 
threat following 9/11 -  a process known as ―derogation‖.85 The House of Lords issued a 
declaration of incompatibility (which ultimately resulted in a change in the relevant law) 
in part because the mechanism by which the state sought to ―narrowly tailor‖ its 
interference with rights had impacts that were simply intolerable.  Derogation under the 
circumstances of the case was only allowed to the extent ―strictly required‖ by the 
emergency.
86
  The Government contended that non-nationals were considered more of a 
threat, and that therefore the detention of the non-nationals was all that was ―strictly 
required‖ by the national emergency: detention of British nationals would, it argued, have 
gone beyond what was ―strictly required‖ by the threat.  The House of Lords found that 
even though the distinction was at face value on the ground of immigration status, not 
nationality; and even though the distinction was intended to reduce the impact of the 
measure; and even though as a result of the distinction the measure was as narrowly 
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tailored to its aim as it could be and still be effective, the invidious effects of treating 
non-nationals so differently from nationals were simply disproportionate to the counter-
terrorism benefits of the scheme.
87
 
Even more recently, the House of Lords admitted that UK courts have not been 
handling proportionality correctly, and admonished them to take more notice of impacts.   
In Huang v Home Secretary
88
 the Lords sought to repair a gap in the leading UK 
formulation of proportionality.  The pre-HRA case of de Freitas v Secretary of 
Agriculture
89
 set out a test of proportionality that courts have been applying throughout 
the life of the HRA, and it asks, 
 
whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are 
rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom 
are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.
90
  
 
This formulation of course assumes that if means are ―necessary to accomplish the 
objective,‖ then they automatically satisfy the proportionality test, however draconian 
their effects. In other words, the de Freitas test does not appear to allow courts to find 
that even though the measures taken go no further than necessary to further the objective, 
the damaging effects are simply too grave to allow the measure to pass muster.   
Unfortunately UK courts have been citing de Freitas for years without appearing to 
notice the missing reference to, well, proportionality (proportionality in the narrower, 
balancing sense between the need for the measure and the damaging effects it has).  
When the discrepancy was brought to their attention in Huang, the Lords 
brusquely acknowledged the mistake: 
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This formulation has been widely cited and applied. But counsel for the applicants 
(with the support of Liberty, in a valuable written intervention) suggested that the 
formulation was deficient in omitting reference to…the need to balance the 
interests of society with those of individuals and groups. This is indeed an aspect 
which should never be overlooked or discounted. [The House noted that in a 
previous judgment it had said]  that the judgment on proportionality: 
 
"must always involve the striking of a fair balance between the rights of 
the individual and the interests of the community which is inherent in the 
whole of the Convention. The severity and consequences of the 
interference will call for careful assessment at this stage.".  
 
‗If, as counsel suggest, insufficient attention has been paid to this requirement, the 
failure should be made good.
91
 
 
As correct as it clearly is, this passage treats the absence of an ―overriding requirement‖ 
of proportionality from a ―widely cited and applied‖ test as if it requires nothing more 
than a quick reminder to the courts not to do it again.  The opinion says nothing about 
how the proper balance should be struck, leaving doubt that any great sea change has 
occurred. 
 Skepticism about the Lords‘ commitment to weighing impacts stems from more 
than the fact that they stopped short of providing guidance on what to weigh, how to 
assign values, and how to strike the balance.
92
  In another recent case, involving the right 
to religious freedom under Article 9 ECHR, the Lords made similar statements, striking 
the perfect note about proportionality, and then proceeded to apply it without any 
mention of the impacts of the alleged discrimination.  In R (SB) v. Governors of Denbigh 
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High School,
93
 the leading judgment reminded courts that when they reached the 
proportionality part of the analysis, they must not merely examine whether the decision-
maker performed the correct inquiry, they must perform it themselves: 
 
The domestic court must now make a value judgment, an evaluation, by reference 
to the circumstances prevailing at the relevant time. Proportionality must be 
judged objectively, by the court. As [Paul] Davies observed in his article cited 
above, "The retreat to procedure is of course a way of avoiding difficult 
questions". But it is in my view clear that the court must confront these questions, 
however difficult.
94
 
 
Having thus paid his respects to the importance of impacts, Lord Bingham then 
proceeded to reject the Court of Appeal‘s finding of a violation of Article 9, relying 
exclusively on the persuasiveness of the reasons in support of the challenged measure
95
 
without ever going on to examine the impact of the disputed measures on those affected 
by them.  Huang and Denbigh are of course only the most recent installments in a long 
line of cases in which appellate courts intone the talismanic words for the benefit of 
lower courts, without actually getting their hands dirty with the claimant‘s side of the 
analysis. 
Although all of the foregoing House of Lords pronouncements illustrate the 
difference in potential between proportionality and strict scrutiny, they do not 
demonstrate the true potential of proportionality.  For example, the impact upon terrorist 
suspects of detention without trial in A and Ors was easy for the Law Lords to 
understand.  They did not need social sciences literature to prove to them that 
incarcerating non-nationals while letting similarly situated nationals go free brought the 
law into disrepute, violated compelling interests in equality and social inclusion, and very 
probably created resentments among resident non-nationals.  They were directed by 
proportionality to give the impacts a weight, and to balance them against the benefits, so 
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they gave the impacts the substantial weight they obviously deserved.  But for 
proportionality to come fully into its own, courts must be open to having non-obvious 
impacts proved to them by expert evidence.   
Human rights advocates in the UK must force the impact side of proportionality 
into the forefront of the jurisprudence of Article 14.  The proportionality rubric provides 
a basis for demanding that courts not only recognise that impacts can outweigh even 
well-intentioned and narrowly tailored laws, but that they pay as much attention to 
assigning a fair weight to those impacts as they currently do to assessing the quality of 
challenged legislation.  Article 14‘s character as a protective, as opposed to prosecutorial, 
anti-discrimination provision is well established.
96
  This attribute, coupled with a robust 
application of proportionality, makes Article 14 capable of reaching any situation where 
state action has the effect of exposing people to different treatment because of their race 
or religion, and can in effect set the level of scrutiny to which the state measure will be 
subjected on a case-by-case basis, depending not on a one-size-fits-all suspect 
classification, but on the impacts of the discriminatory measure.
97
 
  
V. Protection and Proportionality v Prosecution and Strict Scrutiny 
 
Nothing in the language of the Equal Protection Clause would lead one to suspect that it 
offers any less protection from discrimination than Article 14.  However, US courts have 
chipped away at the EPC by, among other things, requiring proof of the actual intention 
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to target a particular racial or religious group for less favourable treatment.
98
  The 
Supreme Court, in McCleskey v Kemp
99
 and United States v Armstrong,
100
 has established 
that before strict scrutiny can apply, the claimant must prove intent to discriminate on a 
suspect ground. Those two cases are often remembered for their refusal to accept 
statistics as proof of racial discrimination under the EPC.  However, both actually 
allowed that the right kind of statistics in the right kind of case could prove intent to 
discriminate.
101
 More recent cases have followed this to find, for example, that statistics 
can prove a purpose to discriminate in stops and searches of motorists when (a) the 
statistical proof demonstrates a ―stark pattern‖ of disparate treatment by race and (b) the 
police cannot prove any other reason for the statistically proven disparity.
102
 As positive 
as this development surely is, it fails to get a purchase on so-called intelligence-led 
policing.  Police might claim that, for example, the disproportionate stopping of South 
Asians or Arabs was explained by the fact that they matched the intelligence estimate of 
likely perpetrators of terrorist acts.  This is precisely the kind of reason that can rebut the 
inference of discrimination generated by statistics: it demonstrates an intent other than the 
intent to discriminate on the basis of race.  In other words, it is the fact that proof of 
discriminatory intent is required to establish prima facie discrimination (as opposed to 
taking account of intent in the application of strict scrutiny) that excuses intelligence-led 
policing from scrutiny under the EPC.  
This is an important distinction in relation to Article 14, which will require a 
justification involving ―very weighty reasons‖ as long as the facts disclose (1) that like 
cases were treated unlike or (2) that unlike cases were treated alike, and (3) that ‗but for‘ 
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the race or religion of the claimant the less favourable treatment or impact would not 
have occurred.
103
  Under the EPC jurisprudence, if a state entity acted reasonably, and 
without discriminatory intent, the unequal or discriminatory impact is irrelevant.  This 
means that there are cases Article 14 can reach that the EPC cannot, regardless of 
whether proportionality is stronger than strict scrutiny.   
For example, in United States v Travis, the Sixth Circuit US Court of Appeals 
held that where law enforcement officers use race as one of a list of criteria on the basis 
of which to decide whom to interview, no EPC implications arise: ―when officers 
compile several reasons before initiating an interview, as long as some of those reasons 
are legitimate, there is no Equal Protection violation‖.104  The court in essence viewed the 
police as not intending to distinguish on the basis of race, but on the basis of satisfying a 
profile sincerely calculated to narrow down the field of suspects.  The fact that white 
individuals who met all of the criteria other than race would not be interviewed eluded 
the EPC analysis altogether.  Under Article 14, however, that fact would lead to the 
conclusion that the state conduct at issue resulted in less favorable treatment on the 
ground of race, and must be justified.
105
  
A more powerful illustration of the full potential of Article 14 is provided by 
Brown v City of Oneonta,
106
 where the Second Circuit US Court of Appeals held that no 
race discrimination had occurred when the police used race as part of a purportedly 
neutral policy of stopping and searching persons who matched an eyewitness description.  
The police in a small college town had an eyewitness account to the effect that a burglary 
had been committed by a young, African-American male, who allegedly received a 
wound to the hand in a struggle with the victim.
107
  The police reacted by interrogating 
every black student in the local college (roughly 75) and ―stopping and questioning non-
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white persons on the streets and inspecting their hands for cuts‖.108  The litigation arose 
from outraged African-American residents of the town who complained that the whole 
investigation was a massive violation of their civil rights.  The US Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, however, ruled that the entire incident arose from the use by the 
police of a race-neutral policy: ―to investigate crimes by interviewing the victim, getting 
a description of the assailant, and seeking out persons who matched that description.‖109  
Thus the fact that ―but for‖ their race the claimants would not have been interrogated or 
stopped and searched (for cuts) did not prove discrimination in the absence of evidence 
that there was a racial motive behind the policy.  As a result of the finding that no race 
discrimination had occurred, no strict scrutiny was applied, with the predictable result 
that no violation of the EPC was found. 
It should be clear by now that under Article 14, a justification incorporating 
proportionality would be required on the facts of Brown v City of Oneonta.
 110
  Because 
white people, similarly situated in every relevant respect (young, male, and walking 
down the street or young, male, and attending the local college) were not stopped, 
examined or interrogated, and because the claimants would not have been treated less 
favourably than those white people but for the fact that they were black, prima facie 
discrimination would have been established, and Article 14 would call for a justification 
of the state action.
111
  But the difference between the two approaches does not stop here. 
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Even had strict scrutiny under the EPC been applied,
112
 the policy would almost certainly 
have been found to satisfy it; in contrast, the blanket stopping and interrogation of young 
black men could well have been found to offend the principle of proportionality and thus 
fallen afoul of Article 14, were a similar policy have been challenged under the 
Convention in a European state. . 
This point is well illustrated by Bernard Harcourt‘s strong critique of the 
reasoning in Oneonta.  Harcourt takes the court to task for assuming that a profile based 
on eyewitness testimony differs in kind, rather than degree, from a profile based on, for 
example, an alleged statistical probability that a Muslim or South Asian man is more 
likely to be planning a terrorist attack than other people entering an Airport.  In either 
case, he observes, the law enforcement officers consciously use the race of targets as a 
reason to stop and interrogate them, and the eyewitness case differs only because the 
police employed an arguably more valid predictor: the witness‘s claim that the burglar 
was black versus official intelligence that putative terrorists are Muslim or Asian.
113
  
Harcourt argues that the court should have treated the case as one of race discrimination 
requiring strict scrutiny.  Tellingly, however, he appears to assume that the mass stops 
and interrogations in Oneonta would have satisfied strict scrutiny.  His quarrel was not 
with the result, but with how the court got there.  His claim was that the extent to which a 
particular kind of information ―narrows down the suspect pool‖ is a matter of the 
effectiveness of the measure, and whether it is ―narrowly tailored‖ to achieving the 
compelling state interest.  If it reliably and significantly narrows the pool, it is narrowly 
tailored to its objective.  This is consistent with the orthodox approach under the EPC, 
which does not take into account the extent of the impact of the measure as a separate 
consideration.  The requirement that a measure be narrowly tailored takes impact into 
account, but only insofar as it can be shown that the state could achieve its aim with less 
impact, and thus that the challenged measure was not, in fact, narrowly tailored.  The 
Oneonta profile could satisfy strict scrutiny because (1) there were only four pieces of 
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information offered in the eyewitness statement (young, black, male, cut), (2) using these 
would narrow down the field significantly, (3) dropping any one of the traits from the list 
would render the profile ineffective, and (4) not searching everyone who had the relevant 
characteristics would not be effective.  The state could not more narrowly tailor its 
investigative technique and still retain its effectiveness in pursuing the compelling state 
interest in apprehending burglars.
114
 
Unfortunately, nowhere does the EPC jurisprudence require the court to ask if the 
impact was so unacceptable that the state should drop the technique altogether.  A 
different US court might well be moved by the breadth and notoriety of the investigatory 
sweep to rule that the plan was not narrowly tailored to the objective of catching the 
alleged burglar.  However, the logic would be strained.  What is it about the challenged 
investigation that did not ―fit‖ the interest of crime prevention?  If the interests of society 
required that the burglar be apprehended, and there was not a single lead other than the 
race, gender, age, and wounding of the suspect (and assuming there were good reasons to 
believe that the burglar came from and remained in the vicinity), the method seems to fit 
the objective like a glove.
115
  The police could not very well check just half of the young 
black men because that could easily deprive the investigation of 100% of its 
effectiveness.   
One could argue that the impacts of the mass interrogations would undermine 
future law enforcement efforts and thus were not narrowly tailored, but that is a fudge: 
what really bothers one about the case is not one‘s fear for the future success of law 
enforcement but the simple, gut-level wrongness of treating every young black man in a 
small American town as a potential criminal.  The act itself is just so blunt and divisive, 
so destructive of social inclusion for reasons unconnected to law enforcement objectives, 
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that it simply should not be tolerated.  The need, imposed by the EPC rubric, to weave 
such intolerable impacts into the narrow tailoring analysis requires sympathetic courts to 
engage in embarrassing pettifoggery to get to the ―right‖ result, and allows unsympathetic 
courts simply not to see the problem.   
An EPC analysis performed by the US Supreme Court as currently constituted 
could quite easily wave the Oneonta investigation through strict scrutiny, assuming that 
there really were no less restrictive means of pursuing the investigation effectively, and 
of taking useful advantage of the eyewitness account.  And of course, in fact, it never got 
to strict scrutiny because somehow separating black students out from white classmates 
in identical situations in every respect except skin colour was not found to amount to 
prima facie racial discrimination under the EPC. In contrast, Article 14 would have found 
discrimination in such a situation, and required the state to proffer a proportionality 
justification complete with ―weighty reasons‖.  This proportionality justification should 
fail because the impact, on individual rights, group rights, and society in general, of 
interrogating every young black man in a small American town simply outweighs the 
state‘s interest in catching one small-time burglar.  Proportionality would not treat all 
policing objectives as having the same ―compelling‖ weight, but would ask on a case by 
case basis whether the law enforcement aim at issue justified the burden imposed.  This 
analysis could take into account evidence of inflated perceptions of risk, which might 
undermine state claims of a compelling need for action.  Following that rubric even the 
Oneonta court would find it hard to conclude that the need to find people to question 
about a thwarted burglary outweighed the social and individual impacts of the police‘s 
sweep of the town. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Law enforcement efforts to uncover terrorist plots and to prevent terrorists from 
bringing weapons or explosives into public places or transportation networks can always 
be characterized as pursuing a ―compelling state interest‖.  The fact that counter-
terrorism officers have so few avenues for identifying who might perpetrate these acts 
means that police will often have no effective alternative means of pursuing that interest 
 33 
other than, for example, stopping and searching young, South Asian or obviously Muslim 
men carrying backpacks into the London Underground.  In the face of this kind of 
challenge the Equal Protection Clause seems a very crude tool.  Once the state‘s objective 
clears the one-size-fits-all ―compelling‖ threshold, it triggers a one-sided ―narrowly 
tailored‖ analysis which scrutinizes the measure or act only from the perspective of the 
state or the police, offering no place in its framework for a nuanced balancing of the 
interests of the state against the interests of affected minorities and against burdens on the 
social fabric.  A finding that the need to fight terrorism is ―compelling‖ fails adequately 
to reflect the atmosphere in which inflated perceptions of risk can make a variety of 
hastily conceived and ill-considered measures appear compelling.  The Equal Protection 
Clause as currently applied simply has no way to deal with regulatory or enforcement 
distinctions driven by (at least consciously) neutral but overblown intentions, that 
nevertheless cause individuals or groups to experience unequal treatment under the law.   
By comparison, Article 14 of the ECHR seems custom made to tackle racial and 
religious profiling in a counter-terrorism context.  It applies to any state distinction that 
burdens the equal enjoyment of rights, regardless of government intention.  It can prohibit 
as unjustified the use of hysterical, unimaginative, or insensitive law enforcement 
techniques whose social costs outweigh their counter-terrorism benefits, even if they are 
the only, and thus by definition the lest restrictive, techniques the police can think of.  In 
short, if the evidence in a given case supports a finding that using a generalized racial 
profile in a given case overestimates the threat, only modestly advances law enforcement 
aims, and profoundly undermines social inclusion, Article 14 allows the courts to tell the 
police that if they can come up with nothing better than to stop and search every young 
Arab or South Asian man then they must search everyone until they think of something 
more effective and less divisive.
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